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ABSTRACT 
Recent terrorist threats and actions have lead to a renewed interest in the technical field of large 
scale, urban environment decontamination.  One of the driving forces for this interest is the 
prospect for the cleanup and removal of radioactive dispersal device (RDD or “dirty bomb”) 
residues.  In response, the United States Government has spent many millions of dollars 
investigating RDD contamination and novel decontamination methodologies.    The efficiency of 
RDD cleanup response will be improved with these new developments and a better understanding 
of the “old reliable” methodologies. 
While an RDD is primarily an economic and psychological weapon, the need to cleanup and 
return valuable or culturally significant resources to the public is nonetheless valid.  Several 
private companies, universities and National Laboratories are currently developing novel RDD 
cleanup technologies.  Because of its longstanding association with radioactive facilities, the U. 
S. Department of Energy National Laboratories are at the forefront in developing and testing new 
RDD decontamination methods.  However, such cleanup technologies are likely to be fairly task 
specific; while many different contamination mechanisms, substrate and environmental 
conditions will make actual application more complicated.  Some major efforts have also been 
made to model potential contamination, to evaluate both old and new decontamination techniques 
and to assess their readiness for use. 
There are a number of significant lessons that can be gained from a look at previous large scale 
cleanup projects.  Too often we are quick to apply a costly “package and dispose” method when 
sound technological cleaning approaches are available.  Understanding historical perspectives, 
advanced planning and constant technology improvement are essential to successful 
decontamination. 
INTRODUCTION
In additional to the infamous events of September 11, 2001, recent terrorist threats and actions 
have focused interest on decontamination plans and decontamination research in various areas.  
The most obvious of case is the anthrax contamination events of October 2001.  These events 
lead to “field trials” of various chemical/biological decontaminants that was termed a “research 
project” and “Decontamination 101” in testimony before the House Science Committee.[1]  The 
threat of terrorist radiological events grew with the discovery of mature plots in the United States 
(U.S.) and an actual radiological dispersal device (RDD) placed in Moscow, Russia; thankfully 
there has been no actual explosion of this kind of device.  This intense interest in decontamination 
methods has lead to the development of new products.  Some of these products have a sound 
basis in previous decontamination art and many are being tested in diverse conditions and 
facilities around the U.S. 
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The types of a terrorist radiological contamination event that might occur are as diverse as the 
research programs involved in mitigating the threat.  A RDD is simply an apparatus designed to 
spread radioactive contamination by ejecting it (explosively, as a spray, or in a similar manner) 
into a target area.  The term “dirty bomb”, commonly used for an RDD, is a bit misleading as the 
dispersal could occur without employing an explosive but even by simple distribution such as a 
crop duster type or even a common handheld agricultural sprayer[2], which may produce a 
limited but potentially more difficult decontamination concern.   
The RDD is not truly a weapon of “Mass Destruction” but one of “Mass Disruption” because the 
terrorist intention is to cause fear, panic and deny access to target areas.  The denial of access to 
target areas, due to fear of radiological hazards, may have tremendous economic and social 
impact in the U.S.  In one estimate, a radiological device detonated in Manhattan would cause 
few acute, direct casualties but would cause the loss of several billion dollars in revenue and 
perhaps more indirect casualties during evacuation and due to latent disease, trauma and stress.[3, 
4]  A building or monument of historical or social significance may also be a potential target, for 
instance a historical site in Washington D.C, instilling a national sense of cultural loss.   
Because of the real and horrific nature of an RDD event, the importance of decontamination and 
recovery from this type of event cannot be overemphasized.  There is a tremendous amount of 
information available about what decontamination technologies have proven to be effective and 
the areas where research should still move ahead in resolving difficulties.  It is the responsibility 
of the experts in decontamination and cleanup, particularly those in the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRC), to team in demonstrating a truly 
unified national response.  The need for action is summed up well in a recent book, The Four 
Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, “Therefore, even as strategies are implemented to improve controls 
over these materials slowly but steadily, preparing for the actual use of an RDD would be the 
most urgent priority.  Preparatory measures can include education efforts to immunize the public 
psychologically against panic in the face of an RDD attack, which is unlikely to cause mass 
casualties; investment in the development of technologies for wide –area decontamination; 
training of first responders and governmental authorities’ and advance stockpiling of emergency 
response equipment and therapeutics”.[5] 
RECOVERY PLANNING FROM A RDD EVENT  
Recovery from an RDD event is a complicated, multi-staged process.  The United States 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has issued The National Response Plan (NRP) 
(Nuclear Radiological Incident Annex) that gives concepts and guidance for the national RDD 
response.[6]  The plan details who is responsible for everything from the characterization of an 
RDD that has become an Event of National Significance to the determination of the final cleanup 
levels.  The actual federal agency that leads the recovery may change depending on what kind of 
radiological material was used (NRC, DOE or DoD owned) or where the event took place (at a 
licensed facility, public land).  These team members, along with others, each have a characteristic 
role in an integrated RDD response.   The NRP provides “big picture” guidance, but direction 
involving the cleanup of the radioactive material is a small portion of that response.  The choice 
(and use) of particular decontamination technologies is a small factor in comparison to the 
magnitude of the overall response around this type of event.  Many government agencies, 
particularly the EPA, DOE, DoD and the NRC, become quickly involved.  If summed with 
stakeholder input, criminal investigation (by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)), and state 
and local interest, one can envision that integration will be vital.   
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A model for integrating these overlapping functional areas can be seen in the EPA Risk 
Assessment Framework.  This framework evolved from the Superfund process of combining 
technical, quantitative solutions with qualitative needs and attributes.[7]  This time-tested 
coordination framework seems a good fit for recovery efforts and is an example of ready tools 
available from recovery team members.  It involves technically based standards with the 
involvement of political, social and stakeholder criteria to develop remediation decisions.  It is 
shown graphically in Figure 1.  An approach using this framework and possibly incorporating a 
modified Data Quality Objectives (DQO) process to identify technical issues (such as 
decontamination waste management) will allow stakeholder input in determining what 
contaminated items are treated and what treatments are included.  
Figure 1.  EPA Risk Management Decision Framework  
The technical issues involved in decontamination of the RDD residues, while not trivial, are not 
as difficult to navigate as some of the other integration issues surrounding a RDD recovery.  A 
very important prerequisite for decontamination is characterizing the physical and chemical 
nature of the contaminants.  Characterization, along with understanding the environmental 
conditions and the operating parameters, will begin to develop the scope of the decontamination 
requirements.  The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed an extensive criteria basis for 
selecting decontamination technologies.[8]  This basis can provide a framework for a scoping 
exercise, allows flexibility in decision making, and is fairly inclusive of technical and operational 
parameters.  A few of these criteria are shown below: 
- Type of contaminant (radionuclide, chemical nature and physical form) 
- Type of substrate (which building material and configuration) 
- Weather conditions 
- Desired endpoint levels 
- Ease of application 
- Cost
WM’07 Conference, February 25 - March 1, 2007, Tucson, AZ 
4 of 9 
Even these few technical issues draw a significant discussion.  Often a decontamination system 
that works well with one type of contaminant on one substrate (for example, cesium on concrete) 
works poorly with other types of contaminants on other substrate.  But these are usually issues 
that can be resolved via published data or simple tests.  The database for available 
decontamination technologies and their technical data is extensive. 
The INL has also prepared simple technology guidelines for different conventional types of 
decontamination methodologies.  These are reviewed in another paper included in this session 
and were published in a handy reference.[9]   These evaluations have performed to compare the 
decontamination of everything from highly contaminated processing equipment to large, lightly 
contaminated buildings and represent a diverse body of experience that can be used to screen 
different technologies.[10]   
RDD DECONTAMINATION TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
A number of different technology development programs are being funded by U.S. agencies to 
provide effective, alternative decontamination methodologies.  The DoD, by way of the Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
and the Technology Support Working Group (TSWG), has several development programs.  The 
Department of Energy laboratories are participating in many RDD decontamination research 
programs and have amassed a huge amount of decontamination literature during decades of 
nuclear facility D&D.  The EPA conducts RDD research programs, but is generally focused on 
evaluation of commercial techniques and modeling than on development of new technologies.  It 
is virtually impossible to detail each development program, and some are considered classified 
and little is known about them.  But a synopsis of most of the RDD decontamination development 
programs is listed below. 
DARPA Funded development programs:
DARPA has been very active in the development of novel decontamination methods for 
RDDs.  The main emphasis has been the decontamination of a tenacious type of 
contaminant that has been locally applied (as by a sprayer) to items of high cultural 
significance.  The program has rigorous standards that require high levels of 
decontamination along with no real degradation of the contaminated surface.  Several 
participants, including the INL, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Sandia 
National Laboratory (SNL) and the ISOTRON Corporation have made tremendous 
strides in removing contamination from building material coupons.[11]  The testing is 
independently coordinated at the INL.   
DTRA Funded development programs 
DTRA has research programs focused on the fundamental RDD contamination problem 
as well as other interests.  A program known as “Discrete Fury” seeks to model the type 
of contamination based on actual explosions of surrogate contaminants at the SNL.[12]  
DTRA is also collaborating with other countries to support security in the area of RDD 
recovery.    
TSWG Funded Programs
The Technology Support Working Group (TSWG) performs a variety of services for the 
DoD including the operation of some general research and development programs.  The 
mission of the TSWG is to conduct the U.S. National Interagency Research and 
Development (R&D) Program for Combating Terrorism. Two particular RDD 
decontamination development programs that feature in the TSWG arena are the Argonne 
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National Laboratory (ANL) cleanup gel and the ISOTRON Corporations new 
contamination fixative designed to stabilize RDD contamination.[13, 14]
Department of Energy Programs 
Several of the DOE National Laboratories are conducting RDD decontamination 
research, either with another agency (as noted above) or by themselves.  There is 
currently no DOE directed RDD development, but the labs are being used by DTRA, 
TSWG, DARPA and DHS as research centers for this work.  Since the DOE 
Environmental Management (DOE-EM) division led the way in decontamination 
research throughout the 1990s, a tremendous amount of decontamination literature is 
available within the DOE Complex.  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 
is also involved in RDD decontamination development with a program focusing on urban 
grime influence and cleanup in removal of radionuclides. 
Environmental Protection Agency Programs 
One area where the EPA has led the field is that of RDD modeling.  Through their work 
with LANL and others the EPA has developed mathematical models that predict the 
plume direction and contamination spread from an RDD. 
HISTORICAL LARGE SCALE RADIOLOGICAL DECONTAMINATION 
In addition to the current development programs, a historical look at large scale decontamination 
efforts provides valuable insight.  There have been several unfortunate incidents involving urban 
decontamination of radiological materials.  Unfortunately, the recovery was seldom the subject of 
intense scientific data gathering and some of the obvious lessons were not published nor even 
widely shared.  Such is the case for any decontamination efforts that might have occurred in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki; no literature was discovered detailing decontamination efforts in those 
cities.  Other large scale contamination events, like some those involving incidents at nuclear 
waste dumps, military sites or processing plants during the cold war were not extensively 
documented, probably due to secrecy issues.  However, two of the more recent events, the 
Chernobyl reactor explosion and the Goiania breakage of a sealed source, give significant 
opportunity to study large scale, urban decontamination methods.  In depth study would require 
volumes (and volumes have indeed been written), but a brief synopsis of these events will be 
given and the highlights of decontamination will be summarized for Chernobyl and Goiania.   
On April 26, 1986 the Chernobyl Reactor #4 exploded and caught fire in the early morning at a 
location in Eastern Europe just north of Kiev, Ukraine.  A tremendous amount of radioactive 
material (about 10E18 Bq) was distributed into the atmosphere both during the initial explosion 
and because of the fire over the next few days.  The contamination was very wide spread and 
included areas ranging hundreds of miles to the east, north and west of the reactor site.  Hundreds 
lost their lives containing the fire and during cleanup immediately following the disaster.  
Hundreds of thousands were evacuated from their homes and many were unable to reoccupy 
those areas.  The scale of the disaster is unprecedented and there is no way to truly appreciate the 
misery of people affected by this event.   
Decontamination efforts began soon after the event.  One fairly obvious, but not always 
considered factor, is characterizing the amount and location of the contamination in terms of 
radiation dose for residents.  Because of the airborne nature of the contaminant, and the changing 
atmospheric conditions the contamination encountered as it swept across Europe, this was not 
always consistent.  The location of contamination radiation dose was generally found to be in this 
order: soil (high), trees (moderate), roofs (moderate), walls (lower) and roads (lower).[15] 
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Because of this information, efforts were focused on removing soil and vegetation contamination 
along with cleaning roofs.  While these tests and the overall decontamination effort were 
examples of the usefulness of available technologies, the actual volume of waste that was 
successfully decontaminated is small. This is a clear situation of how a planning effort dealing 
with what will and will not be cleaned up after an RDD would aid in recovery.   
Several different kinds of decontamination techniques were chosen to decrease the radiation dose 
from Chernobyl contamination.  These included flushing (hosing) of contaminants from building 
and paving materials, digging up and removing heavily contaminated soil, plowing contaminated 
soil, chemically treating building materials and using absorbents to extract contaminants.  One 
article found that flushing of roads was moderately successful for cleaning roads, 45%-50%, 
removal and that dry sweeping with a rotary brush was less effective (27%-30%).[16]  Another 
article showed that soil removal, while varying with depth removed, was up to 90% effective at 
removing overall dose rate; while plowing (simply turning the soil over) was not as effective.[17]  
This technique of removing contaminated topsoil and placing it under lower levels of soil was 
termed, triple digging.  Other articles point out that the use of acids and ammonium nitrate, were 
more effective than simply water flushing, removing up to 90% of the cesium contamination.[18, 
19]  These results were compared in different situations for dry deposition and for contamination 
during rainy conditions showing that environmental factors create a complex need for different 
decontamination methodologies.[20]  The use of clay absorbents was also found to be somewhat 
effective, with removals up to 80%.[21]  Many of these different techniques were compared and 
collected into a table as shown in Table III below.[22]   
Table III, Comparison  of Decontamination Effectiveness for Common Urban Techniques 
Technique Effectiveness, % removed Age of contamination 
Low Impact     
Grass Cutting 32 (wet deposition) recent 
Firehosing of buildings 0 - walls, 30 - roofs recent 
Firehosing of buildings 0 - walls, 25 - roofs old 
Firehosing of roads 0 old 
Sweeping roads 20 recent 
Ammonium nitrate treatment of buildings 15 - walls, 20 - roofs recent and old 
Medium Impact     
Sandblasting buildings 40   
Firehosing of roads 45 (wet deposition)   
Grass cutting 65 (dry deposition)   
Vacuum-sweeping roads 50   
High Impact     
Washing vacuuming indoor surfaces 80   
Soil removal to 10 cm 80   
Road planning 100   
Firehosing of roads 95 (dry deposition)   
Sandblasting buildings 100   
Roof replacement 100   
Plowing soil to 30 cm altered activity profile up to 1 year  
  0 - 1 cm 0.5%   
  1 - 5 cm 2%   
  5 - 15 cm 25%   
  15 - 30 cm 72.5%   
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The Goiania contamination was much smaller and more localized than the Chernobyl 
contamination requiring a limited response more closely approximating that of a RDD.  In late 
September of 1987 an abandoned 137Cs medical source (50.9 Tbq) was removed from its 
packaging and broken open.  A total of 249 people were contaminated, four died and 28 suffered 
radiation burns, many requiring skin grafts.[23]  An urban area of about 1 km2 was contaminated 
by the actions of the men who opened the source and by their families.[24]  Subsequent surveys 
of the neighborhoods near the end of October 1987 found 45 homes and 45 points on public roads 
contaminated.  Eight of the homes were demolished (not decontaminated) and removed as 
radioactive waste.[25] 
Both the Brazilian Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted a 
detailed investigation of the event.  An IAEA report summarized the decontamination measures 
performed on those buildings not destroyed and removed.[26]  Major decontamination work 
began in mid-November 1987.  Residences furthest from the highest contamination areas were 
the first to be decontaminated.  The belongings in the houses were placed outside on plastic, 
surveyed for contamination and cleaned if practical.  Items with complicated or absorbent 
surfaces with no inherent value were disposed.  Vacuum cleaners with high efficiency particulate 
filters were used to clean all interior surfaces.  Painted surfaces were stripped and floors were 
cleaned with an acid/Prussian Blue mixture.  Roofs were washed with pressurized water jets but 
with only about 20% reduction in dose.  Trees were pruned and fruit was destroyed (along with 
many pets and livestock).  New soil replaced contaminated topsoil.  
CONCLUSION 
While an RDD event is a disastrous prospect, it is none-the-less real and attention should be paid 
to technological needs and experience.  The level of cooperation required in this situation will be 
exhausting for the agencies involved but there is much good that could be achieved from their 
synergism.  Each agency (and subcontractor) has talents and resources to be applied and lines of 
communication should be opened across the different teams immediately.  Development 
programs have been implemented to understand this kind of event and to provide solutions.  
Though some notable success has been achieved, development needs to continue until solutions 
are found to the more difficult, long-term decontamination problems.  Certainly there are 
effective means of reducing contamination radiological dose beyond simply transferring 
everything to a waste dump, but bridging the gap from scientific study to application will be a 
challenge.  There is a significant amount of decontamination experience and literature available.  
Balancing the development programs and the lessons from earlier events will provide better 
solutions that may even alleviate some of the terror inflicted by the RDD threat.   
The lessons learned in the radioactive cleanups we reviewed are that recovery may be expensive, 
and time consuming, but can be accomplished.  It is important to develop a plan and determine 
which materials are going to be decontaminated and which are not.  Stakeholder input and 
focusing on rapid and long lasting dose reduction is vital to this planning.  There is a huge 
database of information about available decontamination techniques and those under 
development.  These need to be included in cleanup plans.  A variety of different techniques must 
be considered because their effectiveness will vary based on the nature of the contaminant, the 
delivery mechanism, the substrate and how long it remains on the surface.  Some of the more 
consistently effective techniques are vacuuming, firehosing, sandblasting, repainting and 
reproofing.  These can be improved with the use of strippable coatings, chemical and clay 
applications.
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